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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand how illusion of control (IOC) can affect the
implementation of formal processes of environmental scanning in organizations.
Design/methodology/approach – Based on the proposed research question, an exploratory study was
chosen, which could collaborate with future studies. There were conducted three semi-structured interviews
with CEOs working in medium/large technology companies.
Findings – Behavioral traits were identified—such as overconfidence and underestimation of risks—which
are directly related to the IOC’s theory. The belief that there is no added value to the company in adopting
organizational strategic processes—such as environmental scanning—answers the research question and
contributes to the development of new studies.
Research limitations/implications – This study has as limitation the fact that it proposed the interviews
to an inexpressive number of respondents, exclusively with the intention to explore better the relation
between the IOC and the formal processes of environmental scanning.
Practical implications – This research advances the understanding of the difficulty in adopting formal
environmental scanning practices in organizations. It can also help understand the motivations of executives
for adopting (or not adopting) such practices. Finally, it is possible to know and understand the individual
approach to environmental scanning, as well as its limitations.
Originality/value – This research discusses the themes of IOC and environmental scanning, demonstrating
how cognitive factors can affect strategic decision making in an organization. Although the IOC is
well-developed in the field of psychology, it can be very helpful in understanding business management and
executive behavior.
Keywords Environmental scanning, Individual environmental scanning, Illusion of control
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Information is one of the most important assets of organizations. Companies are enhancing
their processes to access and interpret data, turning them into strategic advantage. If in the
past years, analytics was an IT issue, currently it is considered as a part of the core business
of companies (Davenport et al., 2012). Despite the importance of managing the quality of
internal information in organizations, information from the external environment is also
relevant for strategic management, and it comprises data from all institutions that originate
or operate outside the firm.
Organizations need to manage information from the external environment in order to
stay competitive (Kumar et al., 2001). Environmental scanning is the “collection and use
of information about events, trends, and relationships in an organization’s external
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environment, the knowledge that assists management in planning the organization’s future
course of action” (Bhardwaj and Kumar, 2014, p. 1). Part of this information, collected
outside and managed internally by organizations, is known as weak signals (Ansoff, 1975).
Weak signals are mostly inaccurate, unreliable, incomplete and fragmented. So, individually,
they are hardly useful (Mendonça et al., 2012). However, when analyzed together, they can have
a strategic potential (Caron-Fasan and Janissek-muniz, 2004; Holopainen and Toivonen, 2012;
Zwicker et al., 2006). Therefore, in order to turn weak signals into strategic information for
organizations, it is necessary to notice, observe, collect and manage them. Weak signals are the
raw material for the process of environmental scanning. The main advantage of working with
environmental scanning in organizations is the ability to anticipate threats and opportunities
that may affect the business environment.
Given the current uncertainty of the organizational environment, brought by the digital
age, companies must adopt methods to help executives and managers in planning and
decision-making. However, many organizations still lack the ability to capture, interpret and
act based on the weak signals scattered in the environment (Day and Schoemaker, 2006).
Much of this difficulty stems from their uncertain and imprecise character (Caron-Fasan and
Janissek-muniz, 2004), which is a major source of anticipated information (Ansoff, 1975).
This perception of weak signals as incomplete and inaccurate information makes it more
difficult to establish a relationship between these signals and the needs of decision-makers,
who require complete and accurate information (Zwicker et al., 2006). Hence, some authors
have developed methods for the amplification of weak signals, to decrease the identified
biases. Among these studies, the scenario technique (Schoemaker, 1995), the collective
creation of meaning (Lesca, 2003), and discussions with experts (Rowe and Wright, 1999)
stand out.
All these approaches help organizations to identify, manage and interpret weak signals
in order to increase the accuracy of these data by treating them collectively, adding value to
the organization (Lesca, 2003). Through these processes, many company members interpret
the information based on their activities, experience and expertise (Blanco and Lesca, 1998;
Lesca and Caron-Fasan, 1996), which generates a process of collective organizational
learning and knowledge management (Caron-Fasan and Farastier, 2003). On the other hand,
an individual approach brings a bias to the process, by hindering creativity, subjectivity
and innovation in the process of strategic decision-making (Corso et al., 2014). Finally, the
distribution of information through a collective perception is more valuable to the
organization than an individual approach (Rowe and Wright, 1999).
Despite the evidence of advantages in collective environmental scanning processes, we
have also found references to these practices as individual, informal and proactive, done by
company executives, which are attentive to external information. However, this happens
without a formalized information management process. Studies mention CEOs ( Jorosi,
2008), managers (Barron et al., 2015) and executives (Lau et al., 2012), who carry out such
procedures in organizations and are responsible for them.
Literature explores discussions and arguments about the benefits of the collective
against the individual approach for management. However, the theory of the illusion of
control (IOC) shows the tendency of individuals to believe that they can control or influence
results over which, actually, they have no power. It further demonstrates that this attitude
tends to become more frequent in contexts where power relations are better established, and
these individuals see themselves as holders of power and skills that foster their ability to
make decisions (Langer, 1975). In addition, Sivanathan et al. (2008) observed that the effects
of power in individuals often include a supposed ability to influence future events and,
therefore, the illusion that they can anticipate them (Fast et al., 2012).
Based on these studies, there are two alternatives for environmental scanning as a
collective method within organizations: in the first one, collective processes are the result
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(or growth) of an individual scanning (Hamrefors, 1999); in the second, individual scanning
practices generate a barrier against collective processes, due to individuals’ propensity to
believe they have control over future events, eliminating the need for a larger process.
The purpose of our research was to understand if there is evidence of barriers to collective
processes of environmental scanning due to individual practices. To carry out the research,
we used qualitative and exploratory methods, through interviews with executives who
perform individual scanning.
2. Theoretical background
This section presents the main studies related to the topics of the present research, such as
environmental scanning, IOC and individual environmental scanning.
2.1 Environmental scanning
Environmental scanning concerns the monitoring of information about events related to the
company’s external environment. It is knowledge that can help top management to define
the company’s future course of action (Aguilar, 1967). Although this author was the pioneer
in conceptualizing this expression, it was Ansoff (1975) who made the connection between
the practices of environmental scanning and the forecast factor, which involves not only the
effective perception of the external environment but also the possibility of anticipating
potential changes. In this work and in most of his subsequent studies, Ansoff suggests a
succession of systematic and formal activities, which must be conducted in order to get
better information for the enhancement of organizational strategic planning. There is the
understanding of the organizational strategy as a set of rules for decision-making that
should serve as an orientation for the organization’s own behavior. And these activities
should be guided by the company’s executives, who become those primarily responsible for
the organizational strategy.
Some authors, among them was Mintzberg (1994), criticize what is acknowledged as a
rational process of strategic planning. Their considerations are based on the unpredictability
of the environment and the need for managers to be sure about the results of strategies,
before developing them. Sarpong and Maclean (2016) observe the importance of lower level
employees’ participation to increase the forecasting ability in organizations.
The concept of “environmental scanning”—practices of identification, collection and
generation of knowledge based on external data, to identify threats and opportunities in
anticipation—can receive different names, which we have identified during this review.
Thus, we can refer to these practices as “strategic foresight” (Cunha et al., 2006; Sarpong and
MacLean, 2014; Sarpong et al., 2013; Tapinos, 2012), which was initially defined as an
organizational ability, related to a high quality, coherent and functional foresight vision that
uses the insights that arise in an useful way. This idea comprises practices for the detection
of adverse conditions, orientation toward organizational policies, establishment of patterns
for strategy and exploration of new markets, products and services. Some authors consider
these practices of “strategic foresight” as the operationalization of scenario planning, widely
used by academics to refer to practices for the collection of external information, followed by
interpretation and anticipation of potential future situations (Clemens, 2009; Schoemaker
et al., 2013). In addition, a more comprehensive term has been used to refer to studies that
deal with practices of forecasting of future conditions, linked to an organizational learning
process—“future thoughts” (Markus and Mentzer, 2014; Masini, 2006; Miller et al., 2012).
All these approaches show the importance of collecting information from the external
environment as one of the first steps to anticipate events, whether to identify opportunities,
prevent threats or both. They differ in depth, but some topics are of great relevance, such as
attention to the external environment (Durand, 2003a; Ramírez et al., 2013; Schoemaker et al.,
2013), how to select the identified information (Lesca, 2003; Mithas et al., 2011; Raford, 2015)
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and its collection (Lesca, 2003; Du Toit, 2016; Rossel, 2012). These steps were classified in
this research as a group called “scanning,” referring to how organizations and individuals
deal with the process of monitoring weak signals before they are noticed, captured or
interpreted. After the information is effectively identified and collected, there is a stage of
interpretation, which concerns information analysis (Du Toit, 2016; Kuosa, 2010;
Schoemaker et al., 2013; Thorleuchter and Van Den Poel, 2015) and sensemaking
(Lesca, 2003; Kuosa, 2010; Liebl and Schwarz, 2010; Schoemaker et al., 2013). Finally, there is
a stage called “forecasting” that includes the activities of creating scenarios and anticipating
events. At this phase, after collection and interpretation of information, decision-makers
determine how to adapt organizations to the identified threats or opportunities.
It is worth noting that this is not just a process of looking outside the company, but
rather to collect information that enables the organization to look ahead. Although the
different terms refer to the same phenomenon—the activity of seeking connection between
the company and potential future events, through information collected in the micro and
macro organizational environment that must be understood, analyzed and interpreted—it is
important to point out the complementarity between scanning, interpreting and foreseeing,
which creates a rich process for investigating and anticipating events and situations in
organizations. Hence, it gives these organizations the possibility to act, adapting their
realities to the knowledge created by this process (Argyris, 1996). Figure 1 represents the
compilation of the stages identified in the literature review, with the main steps that relate to
the process of environmental scanning.
Therefore, environmental scanning addresses a company’s ability to anticipate external
changes. The incorporation of this information into its strategic formulation is important to
ensure its survival and growth (Choo, 2001). The ideal result of this activity is one of the raw
materials for the elaboration and adaptation of organizational strategic planning, which
determines the relevance of this topic for the current management of organizations. In fact,
previous research has proven the positive correlation between the organization’s
performance and its ability to scan the environment (Beal, 2000; Kumar et al., 2001;
Howell and Sheab, 2001; McGee and Sawyer, 2003; Garg et al., 2003; Suh et al., 2004).
The concept of environmental scanning crosses distinct approaches, with different
applications and formats, and it fits the debate between Mintzberg (1994) and Ansoff (1991)
about the nature of strategy. While we can identify some authors who consider
environmental scanning as a collective and formalized organizational process (Rowe and
Wright, 1999; Lesca, 2003; Schoemaker et al., 2013), other studies approach the topic from an
individual perspective (Ahuja et al., 2005; Rohrbeck et al., 2015). These practices may have
some organizational support or be totally independent of the company’s structure, based
exclusively on the individual’s initiative. There are authors who report the need for a
collective process that leads to organizational learning, while others consider only the
individual’s behavioral issue toward these forecasting practices.
Scan
Attention to the external
environment Analyze information
Selection of information Sensemaking Create scenarios Actionable knowledge
Information gathering
Anticipate events Make decisions
Interpret Foresight Adapt
Figure 1.
Stages of
environmental
scanning
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2.2 Illusion of control, overconfidence and individual environmental scanning
As discussed in previous sections, environmental scanning is a formal organizational
process that enables the company to anticipate situations of discontinuity and change, by
seeking opportunities and challenges through the identification, selection and interpretation
of weak signals. Authors such as Lesca, Schoemaker, Day and Wright proposed different
methodologies for applying this process in organizations, and all comprise the need for:
• collectivity;
• creation of meaning;
• attention to the external environment; and
• systematization.
These needs must be identified, so that the organization does not suffer individual bias,
dependence on specific professionals or difficulties in information management. On the
other hand, we find in academic literature examples of environmental scanning processes
that are carried out individually, often under the responsibility of senior executives. Their
assumption is that CEOs are responsible for anticipating the organization’s future and
making decisions about it (Ahuja et al., 2005).
Strategic foresight is often presented as a managerial role and a competence (MacKay
and Burt, 2015; McKelvey and Boisot, 2009) that allow organizations to “penetrate and
transgress established boundaries, and seize opportunities otherwise neglected by others”
(Chia, 2008, p. 27). One of the greatest difficulties in attempting to rationalize individual
decision-making is that what is rational for one person may be considered irrational by
another (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). According to Durand (2003), the intrinsic limitations of
individuals can cause forecast errors, thus harming a company’s predictability. A person’s
ability to make forecasts and his own recognition of this capacity naturally leads to its
weakening. Empirical studies show that the more renowned the specialist, the less likely he
is to admit that he may be wrong (Syed, 2016). In a series of experiments carried out for
many years, Philip Tetlock (2016) demonstrated how predictions made by experts are often
fragile and do not correspond to the facts that really happened.
As for the processes, the activity carried out individually leads to the company’s
dependence on this professional (Vecchiato, 2012). The inexistence of an established process
results in a personal and exclusive knowledge by this employee. In addition, the process can
become complex, since relationships were not previously established (Du Toit, 2016;
Vecchiato, 2012). Individuals that informally carry out activities that are related to the
organization as a whole, hinder the connection between the parties.
From the behavioral point of view, there are also effects on individuals. An isolated action
introduces a bias on the interpretation of information (Choudhury and Sampler, 1997; Graefe
et al., 2010), while an organizational process generates a collective knowledge. If the
professional has a position of power, this bias can make him overconfident, which obviously
reduces his interpretation criteria and accuracy in foresight and decision-making (Fast et al.,
2012). Figure 2 shows the main effects of the IOC, based on the literature.
Biases are particularly common in situations of high uncertainty, such as executives’
strategic decision-making (Das and Teng, 1999; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). In one of the
Illusion of control
Overconfidence
Forecast biases
Underestimation of
risks
Figure 2.
Illusion of
control: effects
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seminal papers on forecasting biases, Schwenk (1984) distinguishes two main simplification
processes in the prediction phase of strategic decision-making: IOC and attention problems.
When making strategic decisions under uncertainty, executives may be influenced by a
cognitive bias that systematically limits the quality of the decision (Bazerman and Moore,
2008; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), and this is the IOC (Barnes, 1984; Schwenk, 1984).
IOC describes the tendency of decision-makers to overestimate their influence on casual
events (Langer, 1975). It weakens the analytical reasoning of the individual, which is a
relevant part of the decision-making process. It leads professionals to think in terms of
convictions, preventing them from working properly with complex situations, which
directly affect organizational strategic planning. In everyday situations, there is evidence
that people are deluded about their ability. Svenson (1981) showed that most drivers
consider themselves to be more skilled than the average.
In the strategy process, IOC reduces the perceived risk (Simon et al., 2000) and the forecast
ability of executives (Durand, 2003), thus decreasing the overall quality of decisions (Duhaime
and Schwenk, 1985). Sivanathan et al. (2008) showed that power affects individuals to
the point of losing their ability to interact and adapt to the real world. Workplaces with
well-established power relations are a proper environment for IOC to occur, and power
achievement can be a trigger. For example, a professional who is promoted may act and make
decisions differently from before, depending on the amount of power granted to him in the
new position. Hence, by providing an illusion of personal control, power can make people lose
touch with reality, leading to decisions based on overconfidence. In general, individuals
affected by the IOC tend to believe that they also have control over the future.
3. Methodology
The scientific method refers to the choice of systematic procedures, which enable the
description or explanation of the situation under study (Fachin, 2003). The criteria used to
select the appropriate procedures depend on the study’s objective. This research aimed to
understand how the IOC can become a barrier to the implementation of formal processes of
environmental scanning in organizations. It was an exploratory study to understand the
phenomenon and assess the grounds for deepening the vision of environmental scanning
under the lens of the IOC’s theory. We chose an exploratory study based on the proposed
research question, which should help future studies on the subject (Petty et al., 2012;
Mattar et al., 2014). Since the study dealt with a complex topic and looked for answers to
questions such as “how” and “why,” the qualitative approach seemed to be an appropriate
research alternative (Benbasat et al., 1987).
We chose semi-structured qualitative interviews to meet the research objectives.
They can be used as the only research technique, as a preliminary technique or still
associated with other techniques (Fraser and Gondim, 2004). Triviños (1987) argues that a
semi-structured interview has specific basic questions, supported by theories and
hypotheses related to the research theme. And these questions can generate new hypotheses
that arise from the interviewees’ responses, around the main focus provided by the
researcher. We applied a set of open questions, in order to capture spontaneous information
that was not foreseen when preparing the initial interview script (Freitas, 2000). Thus, this
kind of interview can unveil information more freely, and the answers are not chosen among
standardized alternatives. For Manzini (2003), a semi-structured interview focuses on a
subject, through a script with key questions that are complemented by others that relate to
the circumstances of the interview.
Since the study is exploratory, we decided to carry out semi-structured interviews with
three CEOs of technology companies located in Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. We chose
the technology services sector because it is very dynamic, and whose environment
demands constant attention in order to follow the main trends. The choice of CEOs and the
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specific conditions to select them were based on the following requirements: strategic
decision-making, lack of collective processes of environmental scanning or strategic
intelligence in their organizations and operation in the area of technology services in
organizations with more than 50 employees. The size of the companies was not
essential for the study; however, we made this option to work with medium or large
companies, which have a more complex structure and require some level of delegation and
formalization of their activities.
The three selected CEOs who meet the requirements were chosen by convenience and
contacted by e-mail, which provided them with explanations about the study and checked
their adjustment to the established criteria. Interviews were conducted in person at the
companies, with one hour duration, on average. Later, we submitted the interview reports
for their approval, and carried out content analysis to treat the data.
We developed the research instrument considering three distinct blocks, in order to
codify responses. In the first block, we tried to understand if there were features of IOC in
the respondents’ behavior. In the second block, questions referred to the possible attributes
of IOC and their effects in the implementation of environmental scanning processes.
The intent was to understand whether there was any potential relationship between
behaviors understood as IOC and decisions about scanning processes. The third block dealt
with formal organizational processes of environmental scanning, aiming to understand if
the respondents trusted them, and were willing to use the resulting information (Table I).
As mentioned above, this was an exploratory research that should serve as a basis for a
subsequent quantitative study; that is why we chose only three respondents. We describe
the results of the three interviews in the following section, as well as the related analyses.
4. Results
This research was carried out to explore how the IOC can become a barrier to the
establishment of formal processes of environmental scanning in organizations. We carried
out semi-structured interviews with three CEOs of technology companies in the city of
Porto Alegre. All respondents were males, aged between 35 and 45 years, and executives of
Block of
questions Objective Questions
B1 To understand if there were
attributes of illusion of control
in the interviewees’ behavior
How do you see the external environment of your organization?
Do you believe to have any control over what happens in this
environment?
Do you believe that you might be surprised by an event
occurring in the external environment of your organization?
B2 To understand if there was any
potential relationship between
behaviors seen as illusion of
control and decisions on
environmental scanning
processes
Can you mention examples of risks that were identified, and
how this was done?
Was there an occurrence—or any risk of occurrence—of a
situation that might not be “under control” in this context?
Have you considered working with an external information
support system to assist you in interpreting the external
environment?
B3 To understand the respondents’
confidence on environmental
scanning processes, as well as
their willingness to use the
resulting information
What value would you assign to organizational processes that
could capture and interpret information from the external
environment?
And what is the reason for not using these processes in your
organization?
What would be the necessary conditions for you to decide to
use them?
Table I.
The research
instrument
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medium-sized companies with at least ten years in the market. The companies do not have a
specific area for environmental scanning, and these activities are conducted informally and
individually by the interviewees.
The first block of questions investigated the behavior related to IOC and whether this
behavior was coherent with the respondents’ reality, and specifically with activities related
to environmental scanning. In all three cases, CEOs expressed that they know and have
control over the external organizational environment, and on what might affect their
organizations. When asked about the risks in the external environment that might threaten
their companies, all three mentioned examples of competition, new products and fast
changes in consumers’ habits toward technology products. This shows an uncertain and
turbulent environment, which is the context of the majority of studies about environmental
scanning (Aguilar, 1967; Ansoff, 1975). On one hand, these answers demonstrate that they
are attentive to the external environment and its effects on organizations; but on the other
hand these answers clearly give the impression that they are in control. This means that if
they pay attention to the subject and get answers to their questions, there will hardly be any
strategic surprises.
When questioned about the possibility of being surprised by some unexpected event, all
three answered that this option exists, given the market’s dynamism. However, in two cases
they argued that this would hardly occur, since their actions—talking to people in the
market, observing competitors’ behavior, working closely with stakeholders—made them
anticipate these changes without big risks to their organizations and operations. These
responses contributed to the understanding that, in their view, the external environment is
under control, once they carry out the activities that they consider relevant. Confirming this
assertion, all respondents see the external environment a sensitive subject, but it is under
control due to their individual management (Table II).
The second block of questions concerned the effects of IOC identified in the literature,
and their influence on the implementation of formal environmental scanning processes.
Considering that IOC leads professionals to underestimate risks, we asked interviewees
about their attitudes regarding the strategic risks related to the external environment. We
also asked for practical examples of identified risks and actions they took. In all cases, they
brought examples of risks that were identified and interpreted individually, and the actions
that followed. However, regarding the possibility of unforeseen risks all showed an
optimistic vision, claiming that this would not happen to them.
As for the individual biases, given that the events are analyzed and interpreted
individually, interviewee E1 firmly said that he shared information and sought the opinion
of others, for a joint interpretation, but not inside the company. The creation of meaning was
done by consulting his personal contacts, his family, former co-workers and faculty, whom
he considered coherent. Even colleagues in the organization could be consulted, but at the
end he decided which opinions made sense to him. Respondent E2 admitted that there is a
bias in interpretation, but he argues that a biased interpretation is better than no
interpretation at all. Finally, Respondent E3, like E2, said that there might be more value in a
collective rather than an individual process, but he did not believe in the implementation of
Summary of responses
Question E1 E2 E3
How do you see the external environment of your organization? Turbulent Turbulent Turbulent
Do you believe you have any control over what happens in this environment? Yes Yes Yes
Do you believe that you might be surprised by an event that occurs in the
external environment of your organization?
Hardly Possibly Hardly
Table II.
Summary of
responses—block 1
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this type of process in his organization at that moment, due to the high investment value
and doubtful return.
Finally, with respect to overconfidence resulting from the IOC, the three respondents said
that they were confident that their companies would not be affected by unexpected external
factors. Surprisingly, their answers were over 80 percent sure, even knowing the risks
involved in this specific market. Given these answers, we asked a question about the
expected effect (in terms of confidence) of a change in this process, turning from individual
to collective. Again, the answers were surprising. For respondents E1 and E3, the level of
trust would decrease with the formalization of a collective process instead of their individual
activities. Only respondent E2 said that this would increase confidence, since a formalized
process would give him access to information that is not currently available (Table III).
The third and final block of questions related to formal environmental scanning
processes and respondents’ acceptance and appreciation. First, they answered about the
value assigned to formal environmental scanning and forecasting practices. E1 argued that
he did not believe in formal processes for these activities. According to him, these
practices could bring results, but they would not be better than those achieved by informal
monitoring. For E2, these practices have value and assist in a deeper understanding of the
market. There is a general belief that the organization should implement these practices, but
he does not see the need to formalize them, and there is no structure for them now. E3, like
E1, does not see the importance of formalizing environmental scanning processes and their
potential results for the organization, because it is a high investment for reaching a result
that might be intuitive and ineffective.
We then asked interviewees about the reasons why these processes were not established
in their organizations. Obviously, in the cases where there was no value assignment
(E1 and E3), this was the main reason. Other reasons mentioned were the need for
investment and qualification, uncertainty of results, work to implement the process, need for
effective participation and invasion of individual decision-making space. This last item
should be highlighted because it is E3’s opinion. Once the company implements a formal
process of research and interpretation of the external environment, employees expect that
the attained insights will be used for strategic decision-making. However, E3 thinks that the
team’s interpretation will not necessarily coincide with his individual view of the market,
hence frustrating those who perform these functions at the company.
According to E2, who assigned value to formal processes of environmental scanning,
there is no need to implement them in his organization, and there is no structure for it.
Activities related to these practices and the main results achieved so far—vision of the
external environment, attention to changes and identification of opportunities—can
currently be done by a single person with suitable results. Table IV shows a brief summary
of the answers.
Summary of responses
Question E1 E2 E3
Would you mention examples of some risks that were
identified and how did it happen?
Individually Individually Individually
Is there an occurrence—or any risk of occurrence—of a
situation that may not be “under control” in this context?
More than 80%
under control
More than 80%
under control
More than 80%
under control
Have you considered using an external information
support system that could assist you in interpreting the
external environment? What would be your confidence
in this kind of process?
Would
decrease
Would increase Would
decrease Table III.
Summary of
responses—Block 2
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The last question was about the necessary conditions for the implementation of formal
environmental scanning processes in the organizations they managed. In all three cases,
answers related to the company’s size. Even E1 and E3, who assigned no value to
environmental scanning processes, said that if their companies grew too much, and they
became overloaded and could not control all fronts, that would be a condition for hiring
other people to carry out these activities. However, none of them mentioned what size this
would be.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The objective of this research was to explore how the IOC can hinder the implementation
of formal environmental scanning processes in organizations. To reach this objective,
we conducted three semi-structured interviews with CEOs of technology companies
with at least ten years in the market, which have no formal process of
environmental scanning.
According to the literature review, environmental scanning comprises different activities
and tasks, among which recognition and information scanning, but also the creation of
meaning from what was identified and an effective activity of forecasting, anticipating
events that call for decisions. In the interviews, we confirmed that in these organizations
CEOs are responsible for individual environmental scanning.
First, we identified the respondents’ inclination to believe that the external organizational
environment is under control. This impression of control is linked to the activities carried
out—observe competitors’ behavior, work close to the stakeholders and always be in
contact with the other players in the market. These activities are carried out with the
purpose of reducing the main risks identified in the external organizational environment:
competitiveness, new products, and fast changes in consumers’ habits. By carrying out
the listed activities, and considering personal impressions about the risks brought by the
external environment, respondents believe that they have control over it, despite its
dynamism and the possibility of strategic surprises.
With regard to the identified effects of IOC on individuals, we highlight three
items: underestimation of risks, overconfidence and forecast biases. We identify
underestimation of risks when individuals believe that some situations will not happen to
them, even though there is evidence that they have already occurred with other people or
companies. The answers led us to notice a little optimism toward risks. But it is not
grounded on ideas or actions, and professionals do not even consider or perceive the risks.
We saw excess of confidence when professionals believe that their organizations will not
be affected by situations or surprises coming from the external environment, with over
Summary of responses
Question E1 E2 E3
What value would you assign to
organizational processes that
capture and interpret information
from the external environment?
Not valuable Valuable Not valuable
And what is the reason for not
having these processes in your
organization?
I do not assign value and do
not know any formal
processes for environmental
scanning
I see no need to
formalize these
activities in his
organization
Risk of
intuitive results
What would be the necessary
conditions for you to decide to
use them?
Company needs to grow Company needs to
grow
Company
needs to grow
Table IV.
Summary of
responses—Block 3
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80 percent certainty. But this percentage is not consistent with market’ reality or its
changes in recent years. Both overconfidence and risk underestimation lead to the third
item, the forecast biases.
These refer to understanding and interpreting the answers from the environment, and if
this is done individually, the process of interpretation and anticipation may become biased.
Both issues of overconfidence and risk tolerance show that executives do not notice any bias
in their interpretations or, if they do, they prefer a biased interpretation rather than no
interpretation at all. There is also the recognition that collective processes could bring better
results. However, there is no evidence of the need or interest in implementing this type of
process in their organizations, mainly due to high investments, the need for professionals’
qualification, uncertainty of results and the need to spend energy in project management
and execution.
Regarding the process of environmental scanning and its activities, we observed that
executives have more confidence in their own methods than in systematic patterns.
This vision puts a barrier to the adoption of formal environmental scanning processes,
especially when combined with other factors that may hinder this implementation, as
observed by Muniz (2016).
This does not necessarily mean that executives do not assign value to specific stages of
this process—such as the collective creation of meaning. However, the process as a whole
( formal, systematic and collective) still does not receive the value it gets in the academic
literature. The limitation of this study is the small number of interviews, which had the
intention of exploring the relationship between IOC and the formal processes of
environmental scanning. More substantial studies, with a higher number of respondents
from distinct sectors and markets, should achieve more convincing results that could
be generalized.
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